"Evil is impotent and has no power but that which we let it extort from us."

"Rationality is the recognition of the fact that nothing can alter the truth and nothing can take precedence over that act of perceiving it."

The book is about a man who decided to stop the world.Through out history, people of ability have been the ones to be discriminated and been made to feel guilty about ,so the book tried to show where we will be if the "mind" goes on strike.

It is a splendid book.Every word,makes sense and shows us,what we all already know.It shows why we need to have freedom to produce and own things.It also shows you the real value of money.It also shows that there in no contradiction.We need to work for what we need,is the message,here.We cannot live on others and be supported.

What is ours is ours.No one has the right to take away that from us.And love can be shown when we have something to show it to.

There is so much in the book,that it would take posts and posts to tell everything.I know a few of you have read the book,others get it now! It is a big book,alright,but it is worth it! But be ready to think and feel a few of your principles being put to the test of fire,Don't shrug it away! I will give it a 1000/100 :)

Ayn Rand,in my new favorite! She has an amazing way to hold you and affect you so much.It is as good a test as a staring match!

P.S: I took those quotes from Divkiran's blog.There are a few more points which i wanted to write about,but i was already more than a month over due,so had to return the book .Will be getting my own copy soon i think ,though :)

photo from here.

     To be a good husband and Father I realize the great need to be attentive and to watch closely to the details of family.  Sometimes it takes a great humility and the desire to be successful becomes a struggle that does not end for some.  Humility, patience and perseverance is essential. Yet, when dealing with children, love with a firm and straight path is essential also.  Being a father is not an easy task.  It takes time and dedication to be a good one.  Today, many fathers are not spending adequate time with their children and the children grow up not having a loving father.  If this happens, the father will defend himself by saying he was to busy working and providing for the family.  This may be true but it is a shallow father who does not take time out of each day to play with his children or hold them with love.  We have to be a counter-cultural family today in order to preserve authentic Christian family life. 

     In my family my wife wears dresses and my little girl wears dresses no matter the occasion because we want to practice modesty.  I wear work clothes at work never short paints.  When we go out in the evening I usually wear slacks and nice button down dress shirt.  Why do I do this?  Because I want to dress with dignity. Today,  many men wear shorts and a ball-cap and their wife may be dressed nice and the husband looks as though he has no dignity about him.  It is important for husbands to retain their dignity because if they do not the children will loose respect for them.  If their is a loss of respect for the husband and father in the home the family will most likely have problems. As parents we are responsible for our children.  Don't follow the ways of the world. Develop a special atmosphere in your home and let the world follow you.

This paper will defend Roderick Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory.  I will first give a brief overview of the theory, and then discuss and respond to what I believe to be its three strongest objections.  It may not be viable to conclude that a theory is correct because its criticisms are invalid.  But I will argue that the theory is useful because it provides clear standards for us to distinguish valid moral reasoning from invalid ones, fulfilling the primary task of a moral theory.  Firth’s Ideal Observer is someone that we should all get to know better and aspire to be.

Biography of the Ideal Observer

The Ideal Observer  was born in the 1940s.  During that time, moral non-cognitivism prevailed.  Firth, however, believed that moral statements can be true and this standard of truth is absolute, to be determined by the judgments or reactions of a hypothetical ‘perfect’ being.  He created the Ideal Observer who is omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and normal.  “X is right” means “X would produce a special reaction of recognition in the Ideal Observer”.

Hence the Ideal Observer is regarded as the ultimate judge or moral expert to identify actions that possess a prior property of moral rightness.  It is also implied that an action is right because the Ideal Observer judges it as right.

The ‘God-trick’ Objection

An Unattainable Standard?

If moral properties are so characterized in terms of the Ideal Observer’s perspective, the first objection to the theory is that this perspective is too remote, unattainable and unknowable.  Note that the Ideal Observer perspective is different from the Ideal Observer status.  It is too apparent that human beings can never become an Ideal Observer.; we can never be omniscient or omnipercipient.  We are not required to be so; to measure the rightness of an action we need only measure it against the Ideal Observer’s legitimate standards of rightness and wrongness.

Critics argue that this standard or perspective is not practical, not simply because we cannot take up the Ideal Observer status ourselves, but because we are so far behind this perfect being that we cannot begin to anticipate his reactions or judgments.   Attempts to gain such ideal perspectives are dismissed as “the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere”  .  Our estimates of the ideal perspective will differ in the same way as our own instinctive judgments, leaving us back on square zero.

Unattainable but Useful

Firth may reply that he never required us to take up the Ideal Observer perspective.  To make morally justified decisions, we simply predict the Ideal Observer’s reactions, and this is arguably achievable with adequate amount of knowledge and sufficiently virtuous character.  Consider this analogy:  If we want to predict the reactions of a bat in certain circumstances, we do not ourselves require powers of echolocation , nor do we need to hang ourselves upside down.  Merely knowing that the bat has such characteristics is sufficient.  As we gain more relevant knowledge about a given situation and become more aware of possible biases affecting our judgment, we climb nearer and nearer to the mountaintop where, supposedly, all is visible and all becomes clear.

Hence the standard, although unattainable, is useful.  In solving ethical problems, we try to be as much like the Ideal Observer as we can .  Of course, this method still leaves uncertainty over the ‘true’ rightness of a moral judgment.  But uncertainty can hardly count as a flaw in a moral theory, and this problem is not unique for the Ideal Observer Theory.

Not a Compulsory Standard

Another possible reply to the remoteness objection is that the theory does not entail any compulsory decision procedure.  Critics assume that the theory requires emulation of the Ideal Observer’s reaction whenever we contemplate a moral problem.  But this is not the case.  Firth is open to the possibility of morally right or justified actions in cases where we lack the time to ponder and predict Ideal Observer reactions, for example when a loving mother rushes into a raging fire to save her children.  The Ideal Observer perspective is simply a yardstick by which we measure, justify and reflect on moral actions.

Objections to ‘Ideal’ Features

Disinterested and Dispassionate

The second objection I will deal with concerns the features assigned to the Ideal Observer.  One widespread criticism questions whether a disinterested and dispassionate observer is ideal.  Firth believes that the said characteristics make his theory objective, but critics doubt whether a total absence of interest and passion is really desirable. When the leader of a state makes a moral decision, one would expect him to at least have the state’s interests at heart.  Can we trust a person with neither emotional responses nor particular interests, let alone consider him as definitive of morality?

In reply, Firth could say that omnipercipience makes up for disinterest.  The Ideal Observer may himself lack all emotion and passion, but at the same time he is fully informed of suffering, and he can feel and experience everyone’s pain.  This makes him better qualified and equipped to recognize the right decision.  On another line of argument, Firth can also say that he never intended the Ideal Observer to be incapable of any passion.  Instead, the Ideal Observer merely possesses some sort of virtue of self-control that prevents him from being carried away by over-riding self-interests and emotion.

The worry of impartiality and disinterest playing too great a role in determining a sound moral judgment can also be defused by our previous example.  The mother rushing into the fire is obviously not impartial and dispassionate; she is compassionate to an irrational extent.  But surely no one would say that her decision was morally wrong.  We see that although a biased, partial judge does not fulfill the criteria of an Ideal Observer, it does not follow that a biased judge is ipso facto mistaken in his judgment.

Finally, Firth would say that his critics misunderstood the role of the Ideal Observer.  The Ideal Observer is essentially an observer and not a ‘chooser’.  Because he is better equipped with knowledge and psychological understanding, he is able to identify rightness or wrongness as he observes our actions.  It may be right for a person to favor his mother in certain situations over other people:  The impartial and omniscient Ideal Observer would take into account our limitations and “observe” this the act to be morally justified.

Omniscience

Another problematic characteristic of the Ideal Observer, though significantly weaker in argument, is his omniscience. It is conceivable that an unlimited breadth of knowledge may hamper or even obstruct moral actions or judgments, because any attempt to narrow the scope of knowledge to relevant and material facts faces the ethical exercise of determining which facts are relevant .

One plausible reply is that a fuller picture can never hurt.  Given the Ideal Observer’s unlimited reasoning powers, irrelevant information should not have the danger of misleading his moral reactions .  Indeed Firth fully accepts that it is impossible to determine what is relevant without any reference to another ethical theory.  He replies by saying that omniscience would eliminate or solve the problem, by ensuring that the Ideal Observer must be aware of all relevant facts .

Not Yet Perfect

Yet another worry concerning Firth’s ‘ideal’ characteristics is that the list is incomplete.  How can we be sure that the Firth’s combination and inclusion of any and all of the ideal features is ‘ideal’?  The Ideal Observer may not be perfect.  There may be other characteristics that would make him even more ‘ideal’ and qualified to be the ultimate judge.  Indeed, Firth concedes that his list of features might be incomplete.  Philosophers continuing his work have added conditions that may make Firth’s view more plausible , but such additions are beyond the scope of this essay.  The function of the Ideal Observer’s characteristics remains the same – to act as a foundation for good moral judgment.

The Ideal Observer’s Judgment

Questioning the alpha reaction

The final objection to Firth’s theory lies in the Ideal Observer’s judgment.  He may be all-knowing and all-feeling.  But how does he perform moral reasoning?  What is his decision process?  Critics may say that the “alpha reaction” (the special reaction of recognition described by Firth) is too simple a reasoning process, if it can even be called one.  They would argue that complex moral problems cannot be compared to the phenomenon or experience of recognizing your mother in a shopping mall .

There is an even more fundamental problem.  Even after a person is provided with all the relevant facts and human feelings, he would still find it hard to produce a judgment on a complex moral problem.  Juries spend a lot of time deliberating their verdict.  Wise lords and learned judges face competing claims and considerations in every case, and it is often in the most complex problems in the highest level of courts that dissenting judgments arise.  How does the Ideal Observer weigh and balance the facts?  What is his priority in different claims of emotion?  Can the alpha reaction truly account for the Ideal Observer’s choice?

The Hypothetical Judge

Firth seems to think so.  Or rather, he believes that we do not need to know the Ideal Observer’s reasoning process, deliberately leaving open the exact nature of the alpha reaction. The alpha reaction, or the reasoning process of a hypothetical judge, is also hypothetical and we need not be too concerned about it.  Firth can very plausibly say that the Ideal Observer, by possessing unlimited reasoning powers, would not face the same difficulties as the human judge.  But his more important stance would be that we are not required to think or reason like the Ideal Observer – we need only predict his judgments (see section 3 of this essay).

Conclusion

So we have met the Ideal Observer.  He may not be perfect, but I have defended some of his controversial characteristics.  The bottom line is that he is better equipped than we are, and hence his features form the foundations for good moral judgment.

I have also shown that his reasoning process does not matter to us, and that it is indeed possible for human beings to predict his alpha reaction.  Hence the theory is useful not only because it is comprehensive and accounts for both factual knowledge and human emotion.  The Ideal Observer provides a clear standard of moral rightness, and encourages a method for human beings to estimate that rightness.  Our estimations may not be correct, but we will at least achieve moral justification in the Ideal Observer’s eyes.

Finally, we see that the Ideal Observer is mysterious.  He does not speak and we may never know what he really thinks.  Firth’s theory does not commit us to any particular normative ethical theory.  We are left free to reflect, discuss and debate over what the Ideal Observer would perceive to be right.  This leaves the road clear for us to mark our way closer and closer to the ultimate destination.

I am of the view that it is not the case that the mores can make anything right.  I will set out to prove my point by first exploring the relation between moral claims and the mores of one’s society, arguing for the existence of a significant relationship between the two.  I will then proceed to explore whether a similar direct relationship exists between the mores and the validity of moral claims, as opposed to moral claims per se.

Relationship between moral claims and the mores

Broadly speaking, a social relativist theory consists of three elements:  (i) the moral claims or beliefs common within the society, (ii) the mores, or commonly accepted practices of a society, and (iii) “rightness”, defined as the validity of moral claims.

The first two elements are less problematic.  In most societies, there tends to be a relatively high level of consistency between the two.  This is not unexpected.  I see moral claims as a society’s aspiration towards “rightness”, or their “approximation” or “best guess” of what is right.  Such claims are manifested in thought, values and social codes.  The mores, being the commonly accepted practices of a society, can arguably be defined as the manifestation of moral claims in a concrete form.  In this sense, there is a direct casual relationship between the two.

However, I believe that the relation does not have to be uni-directional.  It is conceivable that the mores can also affect the moral claims in some situations.  Again this is not unexpected.  Examples of the human tendency to justify their behavior in retrospect are not hard to find, and with more people accepting a certain kind of behavior, there would be a tendency to adapt moral claims to condone such behavior.

I will go one step further to examine the relationship between moral claims and the mores in two different contexts, namely situations where moral claims are prescribed unilaterally, and situations where they are reached through some sort of social consensus.

Where moral claims are prescribed unilaterally

In certain societies, morality is prescribed by a higher authority and imposed on the common people.  Two examples would be an authoritarian society and a religious cult.  In these contexts, X is true-relative-to-A because A’s leader says so, and false-relative-to-B because B’s god says the opposite, and in this sense morality is relative.  At the same time prescribed morality can also be seen as a sort of theistic absolutism within the society.  Authoritative rulers or cultic leaders do not tolerate doubts and disagreement, and there is a lack of means for resolving moral conflicts.  Sometimes, public acceptance of their values is the result of unbalanced power and coercion.  This supports the view of moral skeptics who assert that the only “justification” for this kind of morality seems to be that of the continuing power of the ruling authority:  “Justice” is not valued by the rulers as something that is “right”, but only as a tool for suppressing potential threats and securing coercive power.

Under this prescribed morality, the relation between moral claims and the mores becomes essentially uni-directional.  The mores are dictated by moral claims, but the mores can hardly affect moral claims in return.  Moral claims are essentially frozen and so are the mores.

Where moral beliefs are formed by social consensus

Another possible source of moral beliefs is social consensus.  An example would be the morality as reflected in the law of a democratic society.  Here, the law arguably reflects the existence of a common morality in a society at a certain period of time, and this morality is justified in the sense that laws are made, according to the common morality, for the greatest good of the society.  Moral beliefs formed this way are affected by the irreducible differences in the entire socio-cultural matrix of each society .  Given such differences, it follows naturally that what is best for each society would differ.

Arriving at moral beliefs through social consensus is not without problems. First of all the process involves judgment based on factual knowledge of the entire social context.  It is highly doubtful if this all-knowingness of societal information can ever be practically achieved.  Further, in determining what is “good for the society”, the theory also requires objective balancing of benefits and detriments.  Can moral claims ever be justified at all if judgment is based on the limited capacity of the subjective human being?

There is also the danger of reducing morality to a mere quest for economic efficiency, undermining the sanctity of ethics.  Politics and business incentives are strong and powerful forces in the social context, and these forces are particularly dominant in the law-making sector.

Nevertheless, the model of reaching moral claims through consensus has its attractions.  It provides a legitimate and peaceful means for resolving moral conflicts within a society.  For example, democracy and the separation of legislative and judicial powers offer a chance for laws to be debated upon, and people’s voices are heard.  Moreover, the model allows for moral development and progression, because laws can be changed to reflect a change in the common morality upon the occurrence of fundamental changes in circumstances.

Hence it can be seen that under this model, there is interaction between moral claims and the mores.  There is a chance for the effect of the mores to be observed, its advantages or vices to be voiced out, examined and scrutinized, ultimately leading to a progressive “refinement” of the common morality.

Social Pressure

Social pressure can be a very powerful force in shaping the morality of a society.  Whether social pressure is a good or bad thing would clearly depend on its context.  It should be clear by now that under the prescribed morality model, social pressure for compliance could be a bad thing.  In fact, social pressure is a standard means deployed by authoritative governments and cult leaders to ensure the continuation of their regime.  The tragedies of the Cultural Revolution should be a constant reminder of the evil that social pressure can bring.

On the other hand, under the morality-through-consensus model, social pressure can be a strong force to encourage compliance with the mores that represent a maximization of the common good.  However, even in this model there is the potential of abuse, especially in the imposition of majority values on minority groups.

Can the mores make anything right?

So far, I have dealt with the nature and relations of the first two elements:  moral claims and the mores.  The analysis becomes much more complicated once the concept of “rightness” is introduced, as it is not something that can be objectively observed or captured.

Social relativism attempts to get around this by asserting that the rightness or wrongness of moral claims is not absolute, but is relative to the traditions and common practices of a society.  Accordingly, social traditions and common practices can affect the validity of moral claims, and theoretically can make any moral claim “right” in the society concerned.  For example, W.G. Sumner’s theory immediately yields the conclusion that the mores can determine rightness.  However, by using the “best explanation argument” and simply equating rightness with “accordance to the mores”, he seems to have skipped the essential step of explaining why the mores is considered the sole determining factor of what is right and what is wrong.

The absolutist view, however, does not offer much help either.  If there is an absolute rightness out there, what is the determining factor?  And how does one prove that whatever named as the determining factor is really the factor?   It is interesting to note that, ultimately, under both the prescribed morality model and the morality-through-consensus model, reference is made to the common theme of “justification”, usually in terms of the good of the community.   Hence the justification of moral claims in terms of societal good seems to be an important element in deciding whether something is right.  However, it is one thing to accept the importance of pursuing societal good in aspiring rightness, but quite another to say that societal good is the whole story.

In the end, the “unknown rightness”, as I will call it, as with its unknown validation requirements, pose a great problem.  It seems impossible to answer the question of whether anything can determine rightness when there is no agreement as to what rightness is.  When social relativists claim that the mores can make anything right, it is merely claiming that the mores can affect and shape moral claims, the validity of which, however, is not separately accounted for.

I take the view that for the purpose of the societal good, the absolutist model, though inadequate as pointed out above, would offer us a better deal.  This is because the absolutist model offers a yardstick independent of the loops between moral claims and the mores.  Even though this yardstick is not fully accessible to us, or precisely because this is so, it would act as a constant reminder of the potential inadequacy of our established mores and moral claims, thereby urging us to combat our own complacency or inertia, and to be constantly on the guard to look for the possible better.

Conclusion

I have demonstrated that there exists a close relationship between moral claims and the mores, and that in a democratic society there should be a two-way interactive force between the two.  I have also argued for the view that whether social pressure is good or bad cannot be determined outside of contexts, and that social pressure can be particularly harmful if the moral claims and hence the mores were prescribed rather than reached through social consensus.  Finally I have argued that while both relativist and absolutist views contain inadequacies, the latter would have the effect of encouraging reflection and renewal of values, and discouraging complacency in a closed loop between established moral claims and the mores.

Rightness of moral claims is like a destination that we all somehow look forward to, but have no way of pinning down.  Moral claims are like signposts pointing towards this dream-like place hidden in the mist.  When erecting the signposts, we must take care not to mistake them as our ultimate destination.

References
1.    Lecture notes by Dr. M.R. Martin
2.    Ethical Theories edited by A.I. Melden (Prentice-Hall, 1967)
3.    Ethical Relativism by John Ladd (Lanham, 1973)

It will be then that we will finally understand the difference to a human being.

Famous economic game theorist John Nash said in his 1994 autobiography, “rationality of thought imposes a limit on a person’s concept of his relation to the cosmos”. The Nobel Prize winner was mourning his return to sanity after years of suffering from paranoid delusions and schizophrenia. He was joking, of course, but can there be some wisdom in the humor? What is the role of rationality, and what are its limits, in the context of man’s search for the right approach to life, the truth, and the world?

John Rawls’ theory of justice gives us two principles that guide us towards the right approach to structure a society. He supports his theory with the argument from the Original Position, of which human rationality is a core element. In this paper I will describe and discuss the Original Position argument, and I will also try to relate the argument to the idea of Reflective Equilibrium and the Kantian interpretation. I will attempt to show some possible problems with the argument, and conclude with the view that intuitions, rather than rationality, may better account for the principles of justice.

The Two Principles of Justice

To start off I will briefly outline the two principles that Rawls thinks would make a society just. The 1st Principle is that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (the Principle of Equal Liberties).  The 2nd Principle is that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the Difference Principle); and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle).

Method of Justification

A Deontological Theory

Now, when Rawls gives us his two principles of justice, he is not prescribing them on a teleological basis. I would say that his theory is deontological on two levels. First, he does not see justice as the ‘right’ whose implementation maximizes a certain ‘good’. Secondly, neither does he see justice as the ‘good’ to be maximized by his two specific principles that are the ‘right’ principles.

Of course, intuitively speaking justice is part of the right and not the good. But the possibility of characterizing it as a kind of good illustrates the problem of teleological theories – the problem of defining a conception of the good. Rawls rejects the teleological approach because he thinks that it requires a defined public conception of the good, while there is no such conception in society. Further, even with a defined conception, the approach may still be insensitive to certain distributional issues.

The Priority of Right

But Rawls does prescribe justice as the most important ‘thing’ to be taken care of. He thinks that justice (intuitively part of the right) should come before the good, and that we should be willing to sacrifice some of the good in order to ensure justice. This Priority of Right is said to be justified because the right and the good are complementary . More fundamentally, however, the Priority of Right (or the Priority of Justice) is justified because the theory is set in the political context . I will elaborate on this shortly.

A Procedural Argument

What is important to note now is the procedural nature of Rawls’ argument. If the principles of justice cannot be developed on a teleological basis, how, then, are they developed? The reasoning is procedural , that is, the standards of justice are constructed in a step-by-step process, as opposed to a kind of reasoning that tries to ensure an outcome that would meet an existing standard of justice. Although justice is the desired end (as illustrated by the Priority of Right), the two principles were not deliberated with this end in mind, but chosen in a procedural process.

Justice: A Political Conception

A Political Conception of Justice

Before examining the procedural argument, it is first necessary to set the theory in the political framework. Rawls specifically distinguishes his ‘political conception of justice’ from a comprehensive moral doctrine . The distinction is that the former accepts the differing ethical principles between individuals, and instead of trying to seek ethical ‘truth’, attempts to provide a workable solution that allow for the functioning of a society. Specifically, he aims to answer the question of how to structure a society.

The Social Contract: Agreement in Fair Conditions

In answering the question Rawls uses the social contract theory as a foundation. The basic idea is that social institutions have force because the people making up the society agree or give consent to such institutions. By making the agreement they make a promise to abide by what they have agreed . Rawls adds (or emphasizes) one condition to the Social Contract: that the agreement to be bound by such institutions be made in fair conditions. A commercial contract is invalid if the agreement was made under misrepresentation or duress. Similarly, the Social Contract is void if the agreement was not fair.

It is within this framework that the Priority of Right is justified. Rawls wants to provide a mechanism to resolve conflict. For people to abide by this mechanism, and for this mechanism to be legitimately enforced, it must be fair and just. Hence the Priority of Justice – justice is necessary as an intrinsic good  in the political framework.

Accordingly, three questions arise. First, what are the fair conditions for agreement? Second, what is (would be) the agreement under such conditions? And third, how can we be sure if the choices are sound principles of justice? Rawls answers the first two questions in the Original Position argument, and addresses the third with the idea of Reflective Equilibrium.

The Original Position Argument

The Veil of Ignorance

Rawls thinks that the fair conditions are found under the hypothetical Veil of Ignorance. While knowledge of social structures is retained to enable informed decision making, personal characteristics of the parties are hidden, and they are asked to choose the principles for a society in which they would live in.

This achieves three ends. First, the Veil eliminates the possibility of biased choice, because selfish desires cannot influence decisions under the Veil. Secondly, by imposing such constraints the Veil embodies the intuitive concept of justice, that the choice of just principles should not be based on morally irrelevant features. Thirdly, and most ingeniously in my view, by depriving people of their personal characteristics, everyone becomes identical. The situation under the Veil is a situation of choice, and not of negotiation between pluralities of distinct individuals . Because everyone is identical, individual choice in the Original Position is brought in line with collective choice, legitimizing whatever rule or principle is chosen in the end.

Decisions under the Veil

So what would be chosen under the Veil? The decision process is what Decision Theorists call a rational choice under uncertainty. Since people under the Veil do not know their status, they are not able to predict how their choice would affect them. Rawls argues that people would choose the safest alternative against the risk of being in the least advantaged group in society. They would choose the Principle of Equal Liberties because the choice ensures that no one’s basic liberty would be sacrificed. Then they would choose the Difference Principle because by protecting the least advantaged they effectively safeguard their own interests.

Supporting Justifications

The Kantian Interpretation

Some interpretations of Rawls’ work say that the idea of Reflective Equilibrium and the Kantian interpretation are distinct justifications for the two principles of justice . However in my view they are inter-related and supplement the Original Position in different ways.

Here, the Kantian interpretation provides a justification for the conditions in the Original Position, based on Kant’s conception of an autonomous agent, or “noumenal self”  . This autonomous agent acts according to rational principles rather than particular desires. When people accept certain principles in the Original Position, they are acting autonomously rather than guided by individual desires. This corresponds with the effect of non-biased choice under the Veil.

The Reflective Equilibrium

It is also possible to say that the Original Position argument is supported by the method of reflective equilibrium. The reflective equilibrium method consists in working back and forth among our considered judgments (or “intuitions”) about justice and revising them continuously in order to achieve an acceptable coherence . Rawls thinks that in order to justify a particular conception of justice, we should see whether it can be brought into reflective equilibrium with the considered judgments of justice in a particular community.

The Original Position argument is framed by reflective equilibrium in this way. First, we devise the Veil so that it embodies our intuitions of fair conditions of choice. Then we compare the implications of the predicted choice to our intuitions of specific issues of justice, and attempt to minimize any divergence between the two, by either altering our intuitions about the fair conditions or those about specific issues .

A Closer Inspection of the Veil

Desires under the Veil

So, based on the features of the Veil and the Kantian interpretation, on the surface it does seem that the Veil is fair; in effect we are forced to be unselfish and unbiased. However in order that the parties can choose, they are assumed to have a desire for certain ‘primary’ goods – that is, for certain basic liberties, rights and opportunities, income, wealth, and self-respect . Such an assumption raises the question of why such specific primary goods are favored over others. It seems that the Original Position is arbitrarily and improperly biased by the account of primary goods.

Choice under the Veil: Justice versus Desires

More fundamentally, the assumption of primary goods and desires seem to have an individualistic and selfish implication. This seems to contradict the argument from the Reflective Equilibrium, which is rooted in and gives great emphasis to our basic intuitions of justice. This intuition seems not to include self-motivated desires; rather, we tend to attribute notions of disinterested impartiality to the concept of justice.

Indeed it can be seen as a remarkable feature of the theory that man’s selfish nature is incorporated and accounted for; as long as fairness is ensured between competing selfish desires, justice is upheld. Hence it could be that under the Reflective Equilibrium method, while our intuitions apply to the fair conditions of choice and the implications of such choices, the choice itself is left subject to self-motivated desires. Still, one would question why selfishness plays such a fundamental role in constructing principles of justice.

Cautious Decision-making

Finally, what may be the most apparent objection to Rawls’ theory is the assumption that people are ‘cautious maximin-ers’ . Is such a risk-avoiding attitude reasonable? It may be so, in the context of decisions about the rules of social life and justice where a lot is at stake. Nevertheless the assumption is controversial, and further it depends on human beings being rational.

Rationality in Game Theory

The Game

All the above assumptions are based on the fundamental assumption of human rationality. This rationality is exercised within a set of constraints defined by the Veil of Ignorance. Hence the Original Position is like a game with certain predefined conditions and rules, and like any game there is a rational solution – a strategy that any rational person put into that situation would adopt. The only thing that is different, perhaps, is that in the Original Position the consequences of the game is so big that people aim primarily not to lose, instead of taking a risk and gambling to win.

The Really Original Position

Some would go so far as to say that the Original Position is not really original , but is preceded by a state in which Rawls, the game theorist, decides on the rules of the game. In addition to the conditions and features of the Veil of Ignorance, Rawls also decides what psychology to be adopted by the imaginary people of the game, as well as what knowledge to give or deprive. And according to the Reflective Equilibrium method, where there is a divergence between our basic intuitions and the resultant implications of choice, we modify the Veil to minimize this divergence. Hence Rawls goes back to the drawing board and redesigns the game.

So, we now have a ‘Really Original Position’ at the drawing board where the game is designed. The distinction between the two positions is further illustrated by this : contrary to Utilitarians, Rawls’ imaginary people are frank egoists; but he himself most certainly is not one, because no egoist would consent to disregard his own bargaining strengths and weaknesses.

Objecting the Hypothetical Social Contract

This brings me to my final doubt of the theory. Rawls’ modification of the Social Contract is doubly hypothetical. The first hypothetical element is the prediction of the collective choice in society. Framing this is the second hypothetical element  – the hypothetical players of the game. Now, how can a (doubly) hypothetical agreement bind an actual person? Suppose the parties behind the Veil agree to be bound by certain rules of justice. The actual person in reality, however, had not. In effect the hypothetical social contract seems to say that a person ought to be bound on account of another person’s agreement.

Conclusion

In this paper I attempted to describe Rawls’ justification arguments. First I outlined the logical procedural argument arising from the political framework, and its relations with the Kantian interpretation and the Reflective Equilibrium. In particular, the beauty of the Veil lies in its embodiment of the concept of justice as well as the selfish nature of human rational choice. Moreover the Veil also effectively aligns individual choice with collective choice.

Then I discussed some problems with the argument relating to the proclaimed ‘fair conditions’ under the Veil. I also expressed doubt towards the notion of self-interest, which contradicts our intuitions of justice, and the assumption of cautious decision-making. Finally I used the analogy of game theory to introduce the notion of the ‘Really Hypothetical Position’, and posed an objection to the hypothetical social contract.

So while Rawls attempted a rational, procedural and teleological argument, there are problems with the assumptions he adopts, and the method contradicts with our intuitions of justice. More fundamentally, it could be that Rawls constructed the whole Original Position the desired end in mind – the end that is our intuitions and considered judgments.

Ultimately, I believe that concepts of the right and the just cannot be based on rationality. Intuitions may be vague and abstract; but perhaps sometimes, rather than losing our way in a maze of logical puzzles, it makes more sense to say “because it just is”.

References
1.    Dr. M.R. Martin, Lecture Notes for Topic 9: Justice as Fairness (Rawls).
2.    John Rawls, Chapter 1, plus Section 87, A Theory of Justice.
3.    John Rawls, “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good”, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 17, No. 4.
4.    John Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness”, The Philosophical Review Vol. 84, No. 4
5.    Allen Buchanan, “A Critical Introduction to Rawls’ Theory of Justice”, in Blocker and Smith, eds., John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice.
6.    Fred D’Agostino, The Original Position, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
7.    Ann Cudd, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
8.    John Kilcullen, Rawls: The Original Position
9.    John Kilcullen, Rawls: Decisions in the Original Position

Around a flat earth the

edges of providence,

defining thoughts like the

lines on old maps.

Great scary monsters from

incomprehensible

depths, imitating the

sin of the gaps.

Good and benevolent concepts of God

leave a whole range of human experience

outside the places that we have allocated for God.

The God of the gaps is a God incarnate in

all the things we don't understand.

The sin of the gaps, is sin made responsible for

all the things we can't believe to be created by God.

A split universe of God's good things,

and all the rest in a great void bereft of God, where sin holds sway.

Like the old flat earth idea,

where people knew their familiar flat earth,

and feared everything beyond

in the mysterious province of dragons and monsters.

Anyway, I rarely ever buy new books even though I have over 300 different books in my collection. I frequent book fairs, second hand book shops and other places where used books can be found. It was to one of such places I came when I stumbled upon Robert Fulghum's book: Uh-Oh. I'm not through with it yet, but like the Philosopher himself recommended, it should not be read in a hurry.

Still, I became really curious about this man. Imagine my delight when I came across his website, via google, and discovered that he has a journal, right there! Then browsing through the internet, I came across this interview of him:

He is being hailed as the philosopher king of this generation. "Bullshit!" he explodes good-naturedly. "I don't pay any attention to it. What's important is what you think of yourself, not what gets typed in the paper. They're always saying, 'he's the reincarnation of' or 'the next whatever' and I say no: I'm still Robert Fulghum."

The author of All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, It Was on Fire When I Lay Down on It, Maybe (Maybe Not), Uh-Oh, From Beginning to End, True Love and -- most recently -- Words I Wish I Wrote is widely recognized internationally. Collectively his books have sold more than fifteen million copies in 93 countries and been translated into 27 languages.

Fulghum says that on his way to selling literally millions of books, he's learned a thing or two about humility: things that he sees focused in a couple of experiences. "I was in Miami," he begins. The storyteller comfortably ready to spin his yarn. He leans back in his chair as he begins, the light dancing in his eyes as he recalls the day.

"I play in a rock and roll band called The Rock Bottom Remainders. It's other authors. It's Stephen King and Amy Tan and Dave Barry and a bunch of others of us. We play to raise money for charities, because we're kind of a freak show, but we're not bad. I play a guitar and a mando cello," he pauses for effect. Will I bite? I don't know enough about obscure instruments to take the bait, but he's ready for that eventuality. "And since you don't know what a mando cello sounds like or how it should be played, you can say with some authority I'm the most interesting mando cello player you've ever heard.

"Anyhow, we're in this hotel and this maid comes in and she keeps looking at me and she smiled and she said, 'I know who you are.' And I said, 'No you don't. Who am I?' And said, 'You're Kenny Rogers.' And I of course said, 'No, no, no.' And she said, 'If you were Kenny Rogers you wouldn't say you were Kenny Rogers would you? So you must be Kenny Rogers.'"

It's a bit of a reach, but the resemblance is there. Both Fulghum and Rogers are mature men with silvery gray hair and full beards. Perhaps more importantly, both are men with presence. You get the feeling that when Robert Fulghum walks into a room people pay attention. Possibly Rogers gets that as well. He continues.

"So that evening I'm walking along with my guitars going to the elevator and she went up like a skyrocket, 'See! I knew you were Kenny Rogers!' So I signed her card, 'Love and kisses, Kenny Rogers.'"

The other experience that he feels taught him humility happened in Europe and actually became two humble pies in one road trip.

"My books have done extraordinarily well in the Czech language. Like the all time best English language sales in Czech. So I'm thinking, 'Why is this true?' So I went to Prague and I was going to do a book signing and there was this incredible line. And it looked like it was going on forever. So I stopped at the end of the line and I thought, these people always have to line up for bread or sausages or whatever. So I asked this woman why she was standing in line. And she said, 'Oh: Robert Fulghum.' And I said, 'That's me!' And she picked up the book and she looked at the back and she said, 'No. He's much better looking than you are.'"

The Czech Republic experience was not over yet. "So that night we're at a big banquet that the publisher threw. And I said to her, 'Why are my books so well received in the Czech Republic?' And she asked if I wanted to know the truth. And I told her I did. And she said, 'It's because your translator is a much better writer than you are.' And how would I know? I don't read Czech."

Fulghum does not see himself as a great writer. Perhaps, in some ways, he barely sees himself as a writer at all. Rather he is someone who had thoughts to share that people happened to want to hear.

"I did not set out to be a writer. It's something that came to me after I was 50 years of age. And I already had the life that I wanted and the wife I wanted and at that age I was fairly clear about what was important. The success that my writing is enjoying is like finding out your rich uncle has left you a train full of hammers. I mean, how many hammers can you use? It's chocolate syrup. It's an extra. So I take it very lightly. And if I were to fall off the charts tomorrow, I've already had more fame than I deserve and more money than I've ever had in my life. The thought that I could finally pay off my Visa bill! That's rich."

A train full of hammers it might be, but it's the same hammers that he's using to help change the world: or at least the part of it he can get to. For example, all the royalties earned by Words I Wish I Wrote will be given to Human Rights Watch, a cause he believes in deeply.

Fulghum reports that Words I Wish I Wrote is doing very well. "But, more importantly, it's inspiring other writers to want to do the same thing for the same reason. That's my measure of success. I want it to inspire other writers to give the proceeds of their books to the Human Rights Watch. That's what I want to accomplish. I don't care if it gets on the New York Times bestsellers list or not, but people have a reason to care about human rights."

Everything I Ever Needed to Know I Learned in Kindergarten was Fulghum's first book and the start of the train of hammers.

"The kindergarten essay got into that underground press we all belong to where something just sort of has a life of its own and moves around and it gets on refrigerators and in the work place and people copy it." (Read the rest here)

Incidentally, the capability of our sensory organs itself is very limited. We don’t have a super vision like an eagle of a vulture. Our sense of smell is very poor as compared to most other creatures on this earth. The power of our ears is also not extra ordinary. Overall, the information that we collect through our sensory organs is extremely limited. On top of that we can’t communicate even a small fraction of this information using the languages that we have developed.

Today we do try to use audio-visual media to somewhat plug the inadequacies of the language but even that is not enough. The best audio-visual form today is a video which is a poor representation of the three-dimensional world on a small two dimensional screen. Even today after all the development we have done, there is no way of converting any information about smell, taste and touch into a communicable form. It is believed that Dolphins can communicate information about a three dimensional object through audio signals. This is an indication that there are other superior ways of communication which are not available to us.

In spite of all these limitations, we are under a false impression that we have made huge progress in understanding the nature.

Earlier this year, there was a void in my creative life. Perhaps, it was the lethargy of living for so long in a foreign country, amidst a foreign tongue, falling out of touch with artistic communities in the USA and so on. Friends leave. The day job repeats its yearly cycle. All those nice "daily life" things that happen.

On one normal Saturday afternoon, I decided to take yet another leap into social networking territory and start blogging. I chose Wordpress randomly, having heard its name before and, upon signing up, enjoyed the ease of use and the interface. Around that time, I was reading books everyday, taking notes on what I was reading and, often times, re-reading the same texts for various purposes. But, I had no one to discuss my texts with and wanted someway to share my findings, to learn more about the texts by committing them to writing and hope for some kind of feedback. I wanted to develop my written "voice." I dove into E.M. Cioran, Bernard Rudofsky, Jacques Lacan, Carl R. Rogers and others, with all my might. Their world's came alive to me. Their feats and ideas challenged me. Explicating the reading, helped bring it to life for me. This holds true for today, too.

After exhausting myself, I started studying the styles of other bloggers. I had no idea as to the power of the blog and the great labyrinth of sites that are available, obscured by search engine optimization. The well seems to run deep. The blogs I read helped craft new articles for this blog, articles about social networking sites, publicity and Japanese culture. From this, I blended explications and Communications pieces with more "techie" articles. This was not the part of some master design, but more the workings of a mind with a lot of strings attached to it, too many limbs reaching around and finding things of interest. My sporadic pulling of different things can be seen in the piece "Crowley + Cioran + Morita," a synthesis of three seemingly unrelated thinkers, a hopeful article.

At times, the seemingly apparent connections would slip away from me and I felt sorry for my readers, those of you kind enough to read my words and spend time with me. I have been like a whack-a-mole, popping up somewhere different just as you slam the hammer down upon my head. Hopefully, you find some comfort or value in that.

Recently, I have been working to filter down The Eyeslit-Crypt, to narrow the passage a bit more. In the recent months, I have taken great interest in writing about living and breathing people, people whom I admire and who I think are doing great things, whether in art, film, music or literature. I have written about the wonderfully prolific Ken Tanaka, America's Funnyman, Neil Hamburger, Adult photographer/Film director Dave Naz and more. For some reason, studying other people makes me happy. I don't mean this in a shallow "I'm so happy, its sunny today," kind of happy, but a deep respectful happiness to see the work of someone who has sacrificed a life of ease, for a life of creative action. It is the least I can do to connect with these people and help spread their work around, work, which I truly believe in.

So, if you look to the left-hand column, you will see "The Eyeslit-Crypt Information" been altered, reconfigured and I will briefly try to explain that change. It has been broken down into three sections:

1. Creative Expression: I know this is still a large category, but basically, encompasses all forms of expression, the people who express and/or art/business that is making a difference, taking a more difficult path. It is about art that moves me or music that makes me want to go crazy (in a good way). It is also new social media tools, books, music, film and fashion.

2. Life Coaching: This includes ideas and strategies of living from Lacanian Psychoanalysis to Constructive Living. Hopefully, pieces falling under this broad category will in some way be relevant to you while you set out making your own life and facing your own personal challenges.

3. Cultural Studies: This is tied in closely with Creative Expression, but will focus more on language use, media ecology, interface humanities, sartoriasis and other topics. Awhile back, I wrote an article on the Japanese expression "KY," which would fit nicely under the "Cultural Studies" umbrella.

I hope this brief elucidation brings together the aims and purposes of The Eyeslit-Crypt.

Some people who read "The Eyeslit-Crypt" may be wondering a little about who I am, where I've been and what I've done. I'll be brief, but hopefully clear. I have a Bachelor's degree in Liberal Studies from an American university and spent a great deal of time studying Communication Theory and Japanese. My undergraduate thesis was about the phenomenology of the garment and its relation to the human body. I have made a lot of music in my life and have albums available through records labels like Audiobot, Pac REC, Obscurica, N0-age, Impossible, Swampland and Self-Satisfied. I also have one album available through the iTunes music store. I've been behind the camera as an actor for many non-nationally distributed and viral films/videos. I've written and directed some of those films, too. Contact me if you want to see them. You may get a laugh out of them or not.

I have worked in corporate marketing, participated in training seminars and conducted face-to-face training/advising with corporate backing. A bit scattered, but relevant, I spent one week working closely with the Australian rock band AC/DC, translated four chapters of a Japanese philosophy book from Japanese to English, played concerts in Tokyo, Japan and Seoul, South Korea.

Well, these are the things that come to mind at this point as some of the more memorable things that I have done. I know that they are just fragments, but hopefully they will give you some insight into where I'm coming from, experientially.

Thank you for lending me your attention.

http://20000.biz
http://epoch-net.org
http://globalsolutions.org
http://inp-fc.fr

http://openscholarship.info
http://oxfordancestors.com

http://svifsi.ch
http://chiron-training.org

http://openscholarship.info
http://oxfordancestors.com

http://svifsi.ch
http://chiron-training.org

Here at WordPress, I hope to share this passion with others, and find those whom enjoy it just as much.  But instead of going on about myself as most people do in their introductory post, I want to know more about you!  Below are three questions that have kept me scratching my head recently, and will hopefully get your gears cranking as well.  Feel free to answer any/all of these questions!

1. What is the most common human emotion?

2. What is it that humans possess that all other beings do not?

3. What does it mean to be human?

WHO MAKES A GOOD COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

As I listened during the Parties’ Conventional speeches for the USA Presidential elections of 2008, this thought came into my mind: “Who makes a good Commander-in-chief”? Can it be a brave Soldier who showed courage in battle or a General who succeeds in war, or can it be a Civilian who has shown good judgment in choosing whether to use diplomacy first, or whether to plunge headlong into battle, not judging the outcome which can be disastrous.

After nine-eleven, the president made a decision to wage war on the Talibans where Bin Laden, the author of nine-eleven was based, but before victory was achieved, he chose, for the wrong reason the pre-emption of war on Iraq. This indiscretion plunged the nation into a conflict which resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of lives, soldiers and civilians; the disabling of many thousands and the displacement of thousands who had to seek refuge abroad in friendly countries. In this decision, he was supported by a brave soldier and presidential nominee.

On the other hand. another presidential nominee had the vision not to support the Iraqi war, but to finish the one with Afghanistan, to try to set a date for the withdrawal of troops and to cease the wasteful spending of the taxpayer’s money. Of these two candidates who is better qualified for the role of Commander–in –chief?

In two of the most crucial wars which threatened this nation – The American Civil War and World War II, two civilian presidents made the critical decision which saved this nation. They were Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Lincoln saved the Union and Roosevelt helped to defeat Fascism and preserve democracy.

It was Abraham Lincoln who said: “Am I not destroying my enemies when I make him my friend”? We all need to know, even born again Christians, that we are all God’s children, made in His Image and Likeness and as such, need to live in an atmosphere of Peace and Harmony. War and Conflict can never bring peace and security, They will engender fear and anxiety.

How then can Peace and Goodwill be achieved? Remember the words of our Lord:. “Love your enemies. Do good to them that hate you”. Life is too short to be wasted in conflict. Love is the weapon for the triumph of Good over Evil and the harbinger of the Peace that passeth all understanding.

-- Randall Butisingh

No matter what others say...

Keep your chin up and be proud of who you are

But something like The Real World could hardly be called ‘Real’ – a signpost towards the true events that we experience in our daily lives. HA! Drunken overblown dramatic events full of obscene arguments. So many people are sleeping with each other that we don’t even remember to begin with who should have been sleeping with whom. Beauty and the Geek - I have never actually seen the two together. Temptation Island – where does it exist? because I wouldn’t mind taken my next vacation there.

I have heard that a way to escape this so-called trash TV is get involved in real things – you know – like politics. However, Reality TV isn’t confined to Prime Time TV – the most Real Reality TV that we have is called the 2008 Presidential Election. I would prefer to think that delving back into what we call ‘fantasy’ is the proper cure, which of course could only be one of tentative catharsis, to experience reality while what we like to call reality is nothing but a fantasy.

I still cannot believe many of my friends who continue to take a side in this obscenely ridiculous circus that we would like to call an election with the idea that they are supporting something noble and true. (Don’t think that I eventually won’t take a side. My decision will just be based in which candidate I think is less bad for America. My expectations and demands are very meager.)

The Repubs have been trashing Barack Obama for the past year about his inexperience. But Senator Palin! Oh! Tactically, she is a brilliant pick. No one mentions her inexperience as a factor on the Right. John McCain’s real life experience as POW is supposed to give him some sort of moral standing but when voting on the Feinstein Amendment would have cleared up what torture is and isn’t, McCain voted against it to appease the Right.

On the flip side, the Demos have been trashing McCain as the same old same old, but then Obama comes out and grabs the 30 year veteran Joe Biden who has sat on our Foreign Relations Committee since the beginning of time. You know the one which has made all the ‘wrong’ decisions in the United States’ foreign policy, the decisions that the Left complains about. Obama flip-flopped on campaign finance reform when he opted out of public financing and supported Scalia on the issue of allowing Death Penalty for cases other than murder – can you get more right-wing than that?

The examples I bring up are small caricatures of the even more ridiculous examples that exist in our current campaign. Yet they make my point: if you are looking for some truth or consistency in this campaign, you just won’t find it. This is a campaign with surprising turns and twists. One in which supporting issues which one was previously was against doesn’t matter, as long as it helps in winning. One in which picking a Vice-President which emulates the exact criticism of your opponent doesn’t matter as long as it helps with the votes. What we like to talk about is that a possible future Vice-President’s daughter is having a baby, that we have an angry old pastor to account for and that we need to dig into all the candidates’ old drug habits. Who the hell needs Reality TV when you have an election like this? I prefer to watch it just because it has a much better story line.

So do I think that this election is completely ridiculous? Yup. But it couldn’t be any other way. I don’t blame Reality TV for its overly romantic vision of what real life ought to be when what life really is, isn’t real anymore. In our day and age, truth cannot be found in the real. Truth must be found in the fantasy. It is too scary for us to even talk about what we really need to be talking about, so we focus on dramatic events of no real concern and let the inconsistencies and hypocrisies go by like they don’t even matter. The ‘fake’ shows like Seinfeld and Everybody Loves Raymond just seem more real to me. I will leave the dramatic experience of fantasy as reality to Presidential campaigns and Reality TV.

Silenced by the wind blowing.

Thank goodness for Steve Goodman.

And of course without Steve, we might not have Todd Snider who gave us "sometimes growing up, I think I'm getting wiser and other times I think I'm getting old."

Sorry for the shakes in the video, it's the best copy I could locate on short notice tonight.